



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

are no more effective means to obtain such an understanding than by multiplying the means of communication between the two powers. Increasingly from now on it will be necessary that each of these peoples shall know the current views, ideas, news, in all the varying aspects

of their common life. We are told that five million dollars will build three cables. At this rate the price of one battleship will build twenty-four such cables. In any event, additional cables are needed imperatively. Business, politics, peace, depend upon it.

THE CONFERENCE MOVES FORWARD

At this writing, a month after the Conference on the Limitation of Armament convened, one action of far-reaching importance to the future order of the world has been taken, and others of vast importance impend and are expected momentarily to be consummated.

That which is done is the writing and signing of a treaty between the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan, under which the possessions and dominions of each in the Pacific are to be respected, and in case of dispute conference is to be held; also, in case of danger from an outside source, the parties to the treaty are to confer as to what action shall be taken. This treaty not only creates an agency for peace in the Pacific, but under its terms the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is to be dissolved—an end earnestly sought by the American Government and apparently favored by the American people.

Of the matters impending, the naval ratio feature of the Hughes plan, linked with the basic question of tonnage of capital ships, overshadows. Every indication from official circles seems to assure the adoption of the ratio of 5-5-3 for the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, proposed by Secretary Hughes. The capital ship tonnage allowed each nation may be increased slightly, in order to meet a plea from the Japanese that they be allowed to keep their great new ship, the *Mutsu*, and in order to adjust the American and British tonnage proportionately.

When the agreement is formally reached on the 5-5-3 ratio for capital ship tonnage, the Conference will pass to consideration of submarines, which the British want abolished, to decision as to details respecting auxiliary ships, and to settlement of the size and character of the French and Italian navies. The submarine question and the question as to French and Italian navies may develop perplexities, but there is no thought among the delegates to the Conference that they will endanger in the least the success of the gathering.

Another matter upon which agreement seems impending is Shantung. The indications are strong that Japan will agree to recede from her demand for half ownership in the railroad that crosses Shantung, upon payment from China for the interest. It is possible that an international com-

mission will be named to go to Shantung and study the books of the railroad and to examine other economic interests to determine what will be a fair valuation.

In the broad Chinese situation, the Conference has adopted for its guidance and as a policy of the powers in the future four rules formulated by Elihu Root. First adopted in committee and later by the Conference in open session on December 10, they pledge the powers in the Conference to respect Chinese national integrity, to help China to a stable government, to maintain the open door, and not to take advantage of existing conditions to seek special privileges. To them has been added a resolution, formulated by Sir Auckland Geddes, pledging the powers to make no treaty that would impair the force of the Root rules.

Proceeding under the Root rules and in accordance with the agenda, and taking into consideration ten points offered by the Chinese delegation as a chart for treatment of the situation in China, the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Affairs has adopted resolutions recognizing the neutrality of China in any future wars, has agreed to end foreign-controlled post-offices in China, and has provided for an international commission to study the extraterritoriality question. It is now dealing with Chinese customs rates, military and other establishments maintained without treaty sanction, and leases. It is probable that before the Conference concludes a treaty of the powers will be framed for the government of the powers in their relations to China.

Technically outside the Conference, but actually a part of its work, the issue over the island of Yap has been settled during the sessions of the Conference, the announcement having been made on December 12. American claims as to cable rights are guaranteed. The convention will go to the Senate. The Conference is scheduled to deal shortly with the matter of Pacific fortifications, and, without great hope of success, to act respecting land armament.

Following, under separate heads, will be found detailed information regarding debates and action of the committees and the Conference on the naval question, the land armament, the Far East issues and the Four Power Treaty. Similar information as to subsequent debates and action will be given in the next number.

THE NAVAL QUESTION

For virtually one month the Hughes plan has been before the Committee on Limitation of Armaments, which really has been the entire membership of the Conference, as far as armament is concerned. The committee of technical naval advisers soon finished examination of the facts as to the existing navies, and found that those facts show the exist-

ing ratio between the American, British, and Japanese navies to be 5-5-3, unless ships under construction be eliminated. The Japanese argued for 10-10-7.

Inasmuch as ships under construction admittedly are part of any naval strength, the report of the technical men substantiates Mr. Hughes' use of 5-5-3 as the ratio to obtain.

The question remaining, therefore, is whether, in the agreement limiting for the future the size of the reduced navies, Japan should be allowed proportionately more than she now has, in the matter of capital ships, which are treated in the Hughes plan as the basic unit around which all arrangements as to subsidiary craft should be built. Mr. Hughes consistently refuses to consider any increase in Japan's proportion of capital ships, arguing that to do so would be to re-inaugurate the era of naval competition.

Therefore, pending the final decision of Japan, the question of naval reductions, based upon the unit of capital ship reduction, is held in abeyance, with no direct official light thrown upon it except that cast by the official statements made in the second plenary session of the Conference, which was held on Monday, November 14. These statements are regarded as acceptances "in principle"; but exactly what that means no one seems prepared to say.

MR. BALFOUR ENTHUSIASTIC

In the course of his speech, accepting "in principle," for the British, Mr. Balfour said:

Now, I said I would explain, if I was allowed, why I venture to rise first today to deal with the subject which is in all our hearts. As I have hinted, it is because the British Empire and Great Britain, the two together, are more profoundly concerned with all that touches matters naval than it is possible for any other nation to be, and this not, believe me, for any reasons of ambition, not for any reasons drawn from history or tradition, but from the hard, brutal necessities of plain and obvious facts.

There never has been, in the history of the world, a great empire constituted as the British Empire is. It is a fact, no doubt familiar to everybody whom I am addressing at the present moment, but has everybody whom I am addressing imaginatively conceived precisely what the situation of the British Empire is in this connection?

Most of my audience are citizens of the United States. The United States stands solid, impregnable, self-sufficient, all its lines of communication protected—doubly protected, completely protected—from any conceivable hostile attack. It is not merely that you are one hundred and ten millions of population; it is not merely that you are the wealthiest country in the world; it is that the whole configuration of your country, the geographical position of your country, is such that you are wholly immune from the particular perils to which, from the nature of the case, the British Empire is subject.

Supposing, for example, that your Western States, for whose safety you are responsible, were suddenly removed ten thousand miles across the sea. Supposing that you found that the very heart of your empire, the very heart of this great State, was a small and crowded island, depending upon overseas trade not merely, not chiefly, for its luxuries, but depending upon overseas communication for the raw material of those manufactures by which its superabundant population lives; depending upon the same overseas communication for the food upon which they subsist. Supposing it was a familiar thought in your minds that there never were at any moment of the year within the limits of your State more than seven weeks' food for the population, and that that food had to be replenished by overseas communication. Then, if you will draw that picture, and if you will see all that it implies and all that it carries with it, you will understand why it is that every citizen of the British Empire, whether he be drawn from the far dominion of the Pacific or whether he lives in the small island in the North Seas, never can forget that it is by sea communication that he lives, and that without sea communication he and the empire to which he belongs would perish.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, do not suppose that I am uttering laments over the weakness of my country. Far from it. We are strong, I hope, in the vigorous life of its constituent parts. We are strong, I hope, in the ardent pa-

triotism which binds us all together. But this strategic weakness is obvious to everybody who reflects; it is present in the minds of our enemies, if we have enemies. Do not let it be forgotten by our friends.

These reflections, with your kindness, I have indulged in in order to explain why it is that I am addressing you at the present time. We have had to consider, and we have considered, the great scheme laid before you by our chairman. We have considered it with admiration and approval. We agree with it in spirit and in principle. We look to it as being the basis of one of the greatest reforms in the matter of armaments and preparations for war that has ever been conceived or carried out by the courage and patriotism of statesmen. I do not pretend, of course—it would be folly to pretend—that this or any other scheme, by whatever genius it may have been contrived, can deal with every subject; can cover the whole ground of international reconstruction. It would be folly to make the attempt, and it would be folly to pretend that the attempt has as yet been made in any single scheme. As was most clearly explained by the Secretary of State on Saturday, the scheme deals, and deals only, with the three nations which own the largest fleets at present in the world. It therefore, of necessity, omits all consideration for the time being of those European nations who have diminished their fleets, and who at present have no desire, and I hope never will have any desire, to own fleets beyond the necessities that national honor and national defense require.

Again, it does not touch a question which every man coming from Europe must feel to be a question of immense and almost paramount importance; I mean the heavy burden of land armament. That is left on one side, to be dealt with by other schemes and in other ways. What it does is surely one of the biggest things that has ever yet been done by constructive statesmanship. It does deal with the three great fleets of the world, and in the broad spirit in which it deals with those fleets, in the proportion of disarmament which it lays down for those fleets, the government of the country which I represent is in the fullest and the heartiest sympathy with the policy which the United States have brought before us for our consideration. They have, as we think most rightly, taken the battle fleet as the aggressive unit which they have in the main to consider; and in the battle fleet you must include those auxiliary ships without which a modern battle fleet has neither eyes nor ears, has little power of defense against certain forms of attack, and little power of observation; little power of dealing with any equal foe to which it may be opposed.

Taking those two as really belonging to one subject, namely, the battle fleet; taking those two, the battleships themselves and the vessels auxiliary and necessary to a battle fleet, we think that the proportion between the various countries is reasonable; we think the limitation of amounts is acceptable; we think it should be accepted; we firmly believe that it will be accepted.

In my view, the message which has been sent around the world on Saturday is not a message which is going to be received by those most concerned with cool approbation. I believe it is going to be received by them with warm, hearty approval, and with every effort at full, loyal, and complete co-operation.

I think it would be ill fitting on such an occasion as this if I were to attempt to go into any details. There are questions—and I have no doubt that the Secretary of State, our chairman, would be the first to tell us that there are details which can only be adequately dealt with in committee. At the first glance, for example, and I give it merely as an example, our experts are inclined to think that perhaps too large an amount of tonnage has been permitted for submarines. Submarines are a class of vessel most easily abused in their use and which, in fact, in the late war, were most grossly abused. We quite admit that probably the submarine is the defensive weapon, properly used, of the weak, and that it would be impossible, or, if possible, it might well be thought undesirable, to abolish it altogether. But the amount of submarine tonnage permitted by the new scheme is far in excess, I believe, of the tonnage possessed by any nation at the present moment, and I only throw it out as a suggestion that it may be well worth considering

whether that tonnage should not be further limited, and whether, in addition to limiting the amount of the tonnage, it might not be practicable, and, if practicable, desirable, to forbid altogether the construction of those vast submarines of great size which are not intended for defense, which are not the weapon of the weaker party, whose whole purpose is attack and whose whole purpose is probably attack by methods which civilized nations would regard with horror.

However, there may be other questions of detail, questions connected with replacement, questions connected with cruisers, which are not connected with or required for fleet action. But those are matters for consideration by the technical experts, and, however they be decided, they do not touch the main outline of the structure which the United States Government desire erected and which we earnestly wish to help them in erecting.

That structure stands, as it seems to me, clear and firm, and I cannot help thinking that in its broad outlines, whatever may happen in the course of the discussions during the next few weeks, that structure will remain as it was presented by its original architects, for the admiration and for the use of mankind.

The Great Moral Value

I have little more to say except this. It is easy to estimate in dollars, or in pounds, shillings and pence, the saving to the taxpayer of each of the nations concerned which the adoption of this scheme will give. It is easy to show that the relief is great. It is easy to show that indirectly it will, as I hope and believe, greatly stimulate industry, national and international, and do much to diminish the difficulties under which every civilized government is at this moment laboring. All that can be weighed, measured, counted; all that is a matter of figures. But there is something in this scheme which is above and beyond mere numerical calculation. There is something which goes to the root, which is concerned with the highest international morality. This scheme, after all—what does it do? It makes idealism a practical proposition.

It takes hold of the dreams which reformers, poets, publicists, even potentates, as we heard the other day, have from time to time put before mankind as the goal to which human endeavor should aspire.

The narrative of all the attempts made, of all the schemes advanced, for diminishing the horrors of war is a melancholy one. Some fragments of it were laid before you by our chairman on Saturday. They were not exhilarating. They showed how easy it is to make professions and how impotent it is to carry those professions into effect.

What makes this scheme a landmark is that combined with the profession is the practice; that, in addition to the expression, the eloquent expression, of good intentions, in which the speeches of men of all nations have been rich, a way has been found in which, in the most striking fashion, in a manner which must touch the imagination of everybody, which must come home to the dullest brain and the hardest heart, the Government of the United States have shown their intention not merely to say that peace is a very good thing, that war is horrible, but there is a way by which wars can really be diminished, by which the burdens of peace, almost as intolerable as the burdens of war, can really be lightened for the populations of the world. And in doing that, in doing it in the manner in which they have done it, in striking the imagination not merely of the audience they were addressing, not merely of the great people to whom they belonged, but of the whole civilized world—in doing that they have, believe me, made the first and opening day of this Congress one of the landmarks in human civilization.

I have said all that I propose to say; but, if you will allow me, I will read a telegram put into my hands just as I reached this meeting, from the British Prime Minister.

"Following for Mr. Balfour from Mr. Lloyd-George:

"Many thanks for your telegram. If you think it would serve useful purpose to let them know, message might be published, as follows:

"Government (that is, the British Government) have followed proceedings at opening session of Conference with

profound appreciation and wholeheartedly endorsed your opinion that speeches made by President Harding and Secretary of State were bold and statesmanlike utterances, pregnant with infinite possibilities. Nothing could occur better for the ultimate success of the Conference. Please convey to both our most sincere congratulations."

BARON KATO CAUTIOUS

At the conclusion of Mr. Balfour's speech, Admiral Baron Kato, for the Japanese delegates, delivered a more guarded address, which foreshadowed Japan's subsequent effort to get more capital ship tonnage than provided in the Hughes plan.

He said:

Mr. CHAIRMAN: With your permission, I wish to present to the Conference my views on this great question of the limitation of armaments. I possess no art of oratory; I must speak simply, concisely, and, above all, frankly.

Japan deeply appreciates the sincerity of purpose evidenced in the plan of the American Government for the limitation of armaments. She is satisfied that the proposed plan will materially relieve the nations of wasteful expenditures and cannot fail to make for the peace of the world.

She cannot remain unmoved by the high aims which have actuated the American project. Gladly accepting, therefore, the proposal in principle, Japan is ready to proceed with determination to a sweeping reduction in her naval armament.

It will be universally admitted that a nation must be provided with such armaments as are essential to its security. This requirement must be fully weighed in the examination of the plan. With this requirement in view, a few modifications will be proposed with regard to the tonnage basis for replacement of the various classes of vessels. This subject should be referred to special consideration by naval experts. When such modifications are proposed I know that the American and other delegations will consider them with the same desire to meet our ideas as we have to meet theirs.

Japan has never claimed nor had any intention of claiming to have a naval establishment equal in strength to that of either the United States or the British Empire. Her existing plan will show conclusively that she had never in view preparation for offensive war.

Following the speeches by Mr. Balfour and Baron Kato, Premier Briand and Senator Schanzer spoke for France and Italy. Each applauded the Hughes plan, but inasmuch as it referred to the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, they were not called upon to express directly national views.

THE HUGHES PLAN IN DETAIL

Below is given the official text of the Hughes plan:

The United States proposes the following plan for a limitation of the naval armaments of the conferring nations. The United States believes that this plan safely guards the interests of all concerned.

In working out this proposal the United States has been guided by four general principles:

- a. The elimination of all capital shipbuilding programs, either actual or projected.
- b. Further reduction through the scrapping of certain of the older ships.
- c. That regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the conferring powers.
- d. The use of capital ship tonnage as the measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.

The Proposal in Detail

For limitation of naval armaments:

CAPITAL SHIPS—UNITED STATES

1. The United States to scrap all new capital ships now under construction and on their way to completion. This

includes six battle cruisers and seven battleships on the ways and building and two battleships launched.

(NOTE.—Paragraph 1 involves a reduction of 15 new capital ships under construction, with a total tonnage, when completed, of 618,000. Total amount of money already spent on 15 capital ships, \$332,000,000.)

2. The United States to scrap all battleships up to, but not including the *Delaware* and *North Dakota*.

(NOTE.—The number of old battleships scrapped under paragraph 2 is 15; their total tonnage is 227,740. The grand total of capital ships to be scrapped is 30, aggregating 845,740 tons.)

As It Affects England

GREAT BRITAIN

3. Great Britain to stop further construction on the four new Hoods.

(NOTE.—Paragraph 3 involves a reduction of four new capital ships not yet laid down, but upon which money has been spent, with a total tonnage, when completed, of 172,000.)

4. In addition to the four Hoods, Great Britain to scrap her pre-dreadnaughts, second-line battleships, and first-line battleships up to but not including the King George V class.

(NOTE.—Paragraph 4 involves the disposition of 19 capital ships, certain of which have already been scrapped, with a tonnage of reduction of 411,375. The grand total tonnage of ships scrapped under this agreement will be 583,375.)

JAPAN

5. Japan to abandon her program of ships not yet laid down, viz., the *Ima*, *Owar*, No. 7, No. 8, battleships, and Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8, battle cruisers.

(NOTE.—Paragraph 5 does not involve the stopping of construction on any ship upon which construction has been begun.)

Japan to Scrap Three

6. Japan to scrap three battleships, the *Mutsu*, launched, and the *Tosa* and *Kaga*, building; and four battle cruisers, the *Amagi* and *Akagi*, building, and the *Otago* and *Takao*, not yet laid down, but for which certain material has been assembled.

(NOTE.—Paragraph 6 involves a reduction of seven new capital ships under construction, with a total tonnage, when completed, of 288,100.)

7. Japan to scrap all the pre-dreadnaughts and capital ships of the second line. This to include the scrapping of all ships up to, but not including, the *Settsu*.

(NOTE.—Paragraph 7 involves the scrapping of 10 older ships, with a total tonnage of 159,828. The grand total reduction of tonnage on vessels existing, laid down, or for which material has been assembled, is 448,929.)

FRANCE AND ITALY

8. In view of certain extraordinary conditions due to the World War, the existing strengths of the navies of France and Italy, the United States does not consider necessary the discussion at this stage of the proceedings of the tonnage allowances of these nations, but proposes it be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference.

Other New Construction

9. No other new capital ships shall be constructed during the period of this agreement, except replacement tonnage, as provided hereinafter.

10. If the terms of this proposal are agreed to, then the United States, Great Britain, and Japan agree that their navies three months after the making of this agreement, shall consist of the following capital ships:

List of Capital Ships

United States.	Great Britain.	Japan.
Maryland.	Royal Sovereign.	Nagato.
California.	Royal Oak.	Hiuga.
Tennessee.	Resolution.	Ise.
Idaho.	Ramillies.	Yamashiro.
Mississippi.	Revenge.	Fu-So.
New Mexico.	Queen Elizabeth.	Settsu.
Arizona.	Warspite.	Kirishma.
Pennsylvania.	Valliant.	Haruna.
Oklahoma.	Barhan.	Hi-Yei.
Nevada.	Malaya.	Kongo.
Texas.	Benbow.	
New York.	Emperor of India.	
Arkansas.	Iron Duke.	
Wyoming.	Marlborough.	
Utah.	Erin.	
Florida.	King George V.	
North Dakota.	Centurion.	
Delaware.	Ajax.	
	Hood.	
	Renown.	
	Repulse.	
	Tiger.	

United States:		
Total.....	18	Total tonnage..... 500,650
Great Britain:		
Total.....	22	Total tonnage..... 604,450
Japan:		
Total.....	10	Total tonnage..... 299,700

Disposition of Old and New Construction

11. Capital ships shall be disposed of in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

REPLACEMENTS

12. (a) The tonnage basis for capital ship replacement under this proposal to be as follows:

United States, 500,000 tons.
Great Britain, 500,000 tons.
Japan, 300,000 tons.

(b) Capital ships, 20 years from date of completion, may be replaced by new capital ship construction, but the keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which it is to replace is 17 years of age from date of completion: *Provided, however*, That the first replacement tonnage shall not be laid down until 10 years from the date of the signing of this agreement.

(c) The scrapping of capital ships replaced by new construction shall be undertaken not later than the date of completion of the new construction, and shall be completed within three months of the date of completion of new construction; or if the date of completion of new construction be delayed, then within four years of the laying of the keels of such new construction.

No New Ships Laid Down

(d) No capital ships shall be laid down during the term of this agreement whose tonnage displacement exceeds 35,000 tons.

(e) The same rules for determining tonnage of capital ships shall apply to the ships of each of the powers party to this agreement.

(f) Each of the powers party to this agreement agrees to inform promptly all of the other powers party to this agreement concerning—

1. The names of the capital ships to be replaced by new construction;
2. The date of authorization of replacement tonnage;
3. The dates of laying the keels of replacement tonnage;
4. The displacement tonnage of each new ship to be laid down;

5. The actual date of completion of each new ship;

6. The fact and date of the scrapping of ships replaced.

(g) No fabricated parts of capital ships, including parts of hulls, engines, and ordnance, shall be constructed previous to the date of authorization of replacement tonnage. A list of such parts will be furnished all powers party to this agreement.

(h) In case of the loss or accidental destruction of capital ships, they may be replaced by new capital ship construction in conformity with the foregoing rules.

13. In treating this subject, auxiliary combatant craft have been divided into three classes:

(a) Auxiliary surface combatant craft.

(b) Submarines.

(c) Airplane carriers and aircraft.

(a) AUXILIARY SURFACE COMBATANT CRAFT

14. The term auxiliary surface combatant craft includes cruisers (exclusive of battle cruisers), flotilla leaders, destroyers, and all other surface types except those specifically exempted in the following paragraph.

15. Existing monitors, unarmored surface craft as specified in paragraph 16, under 3,000 tons, fuel ships, supply ships, tenders, repair ships, tugs, mine-sweepers, and vessels readily convertible from merchant vessels are exempt from the terms of this agreement.

16. No new auxiliary combatant craft may be built exempt from this agreement regarding limitation of naval armaments that exceed 3,000 tons displacement and 15 knots speed and carry more than four five-inch guns.

Allowance to Each Power

17. It is proposed that the total tonnage of cruisers, flotilla leaders, and destroyers allowed each power shall be as follows:

For the United States, 450,000 tons.

For Great Britain, 450,000 tons.

For Japan, 270,000 tons.

Provided, however, That no power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in airplane carriers on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of airplane carriers for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

Provided, however, That no power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in auxiliary surface combatant craft on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of auxiliary combatant craft for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

LIMITATION OF NEW CONSTRUCTION

18. (a) All auxiliary surface combatant craft whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(b) No new construction in auxiliary surface combatant craft except replacement tonnage, as provided hereinafter, shall be laid down during the period of this agreement: *Provided, however,* That such nations as have not reached the auxiliary surface combatant craft tonnage allowances hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

SCRAPPING OF OLD CONSTRUCTION

19. Auxiliary surface combatant craft shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

Proposed Undersea Tonnage

(b) SUBMARINES

20. It is proposed that the total tonnage of submarines allowed each power shall be as follows:

For the United States, 90,000 tons.

For Great Britain, 90,000 tons.

For Japan, 54,000 tons.

Provided, however, That no power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in submarines on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage, shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of submarines for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance, as herein stated.

LIMITATION OF NEW CONSTRUCTION

21. (a) All submarines whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(b) No new submarine tonnage except replacement tonnage, as provided hereinafter, shall be laid down during the period of this agreement: *Provided, however,* That such nations as have not reached the submarine tonnage allowance hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

SCRAPPING OF OLD CONSTRUCTION

22. Submarines shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

Would Limit Aircraft

AIRPLANE CARRIERS AND AIRCRAFT

23. It is proposed that the total tonnage of airplane carriers allowed each power shall be as follows:

United States, 80,000 tons.

Great Britain, 80,000 tons.

Japan, 48,000 tons.

LIMITATION OF NEW CONSTRUCTION

24. (a) All airplane carriers whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(b) No new airplane carrier tonnage except replacement tonnage, as provided herein, shall be laid down during the period of this agreement: *Provided, however,* That such nations as have not reached the airplane carrier tonnage hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

SCRAPPING OF OLD CONSTRUCTION

25. Airplane carriers shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

AUXILIARY COMBATANT CRAFT REPLACEMENTS

26. (a) Cruisers 20 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new construction. The keels for such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage it is intended to replace is 15 years of age from date of completion.

May Replace Old Destroyers

(b) Destroyers and flotilla leaders 12 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new construction. The keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage it is intended to replace is 11 years of age from date of completion.

(c) Submarines 12 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new submarine construction, but the keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which the new tonnage is to replace is 11 years of age from date of completion.

(d) Airplane carriers 20 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new airplane carrier construction, but the keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which it is to replace is 17 years of age from date of completion.

(e) No surface vessels carrying guns of caliber greater than 8-inch shall be laid down as replacement tonnage for auxiliary combatant surface craft.

(f) The same rules for determining tonnage of auxiliary combatant craft shall apply to the ships of each of the powers party to this agreement.

Provisions for Scrapping

(g) The scrapping of ships replaced by new construction shall be undertaken not later than the date of completion of the new construction, and shall be completed within three months of the date of completion of the new construction, or, if the completion of new tonnage is delayed, then within four years of the laying of the keel of such new construction.

(h) Each of the powers party to this agreement agrees to inform all of the other powers party to this agreement concerning—

1. The names or numbers of the ships to be replaced by new construction.
2. The date of authorization of replacement tonnage.
3. The dates of laying the keels of replacement tonnage.
4. The displacement tonnage of each new ship to be laid down.
5. The actual date of completion of each new ship.
6. The fact and date of the scrapping of ships replaced.

(i) No fabricated parts of auxiliary combatant craft, including parts of hulls, engines, and ordnance, will be constructed previously to the date of authorization of replacement tonnage. A list of such parts will be furnished all powers party to this agreement.

Can Replace Destroyed Craft

(j) In case of the loss or accidental destruction of ships of this class they may be replaced by new construction in conformity with the foregoing rules.

AIRCRAFT

27. The limitation of naval aircraft is not proposed.

(NOTE.—Owing to the fact that naval aircraft may be readily adapted from special types of commercial aircraft, it is not considered practicable to prescribe limits for naval craft.)

GENERAL RESTRICTION ON TRANSFER OF COMBATANT VESSELS OF ALL CLASSES

28. The powers party to this agreement bind themselves not to dispose of combatant vessels of any class in such a manner that they later may become combatant vessels in another navy. They bind themselves further not to acquire combatant vessels from any foreign source.

29. No capital ship tonnage nor auxiliary combatant craft tonnage for foreign account shall be constructed within the jurisdiction of any one of the powers party to this agreement during the term of this agreement.

MERCHANT MARINE

30. As the importance of the merchant marine is in inverse ratio to the size of naval armament, regulations must be provided to govern its conversion features for war purposes.

LAND ARMAMENT QUESTION

It early became apparent that the Conference on the Limitation of Armament would be able to do nothing regarding the primary land armament questions. The best that could be expected, it was shown, was restrictive action on such departments of land armament as poison gas and fighting aircraft (which was treated as part of land armament).

One fact that tended to debar effective action was the absence from the Conference of nations that have great armies, Poland, Russia, the members of the Little Entente, and so on. Nothing conclusive could be done while those nations were on the outside. Another fact that blocked the way was the insistence of France that she could not materially reduce her armies unless she were given assurances that aid would be given her in event of attack by Germany.

Premier Briand, in a very eloquent speech, outlined the possibilities of attack that France sees in the new Germany. Pleading that the other great nations, in their pursuit of disarmament, will not morally isolate France for insisting upon a large army under existing circumstances, he made a very profound impression upon many of those who heard his speech. Others felt that France overstated the dangers from Germany.

But, whatever the opinion of the argument made by M. Briand, it was clear from the speeches made by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hughes when M. Briand finished, that while there is sympathy in both Great Britain and the United States with France's position, neither nation is willing to enter into such an explicit undertaking to aid France as the French representatives evidently seek.

The question of land armaments came up formally at the third plenary session of the Conference, held on Monday, November 21. Secretary Hughes began the discussion in a speech in which he said:

MR. HUGHES OUTLINES AMERICA'S COURSE

So far as the army of the United States is concerned, no question is presented. It has always been the policy of the

United States—it is its traditional policy—to have the regular military establishment upon the smallest possible basis. At the time of the Armistice, there were in the field and in training in the American Army upwards of 4,200,000 men. At once, upon the signing of the Armistice, demobilization began, and it was practically completed in the course of the following year, and today our regular establishment numbers less than 160,000 men.

While, however, we have this gratifying condition with respect to the military forces in the United States, we fully recognize the special difficulties that exist with respect to military forces abroad. We fully understand the apprehensions that exist, and also the essential conditions of national security which must appeal to all the powers that are here represented.

It is regarded as fitting at this time that there should be the freest opportunity for the presentation of views upon this subject of land armament or military forces by the delegates present, and it is the wish of all delegates that the considerations that are pertinent and full explanation of all the conditions that exist that bear upon the matter should be had, and that all of the delegates of the governments represented here should have opportunity to present fully the matters which they think should be understood by the Conference and by the world.

M. BRIAND SPEAKS FOR FRANCE

M. Briand then delivered his speech, of which the essentials are as given below:

I shall endeavor to make it appear to your eyes and to the eyes of the world with its true, genuine face, as it is; that will show you that she is ready, and I might say, perhaps, more ready than any other country, to direct her attention and her earnest will to whatever steps may be thought desirable in order to insure final peace for the world. Nothing, for my colleagues and myself, would be more pleasant than to be about to tell you this: We bring here sacrifices to the fullest extent possible. We have our own security insured. We lay down arms. We should be so happy to be able to make that gesture in order to participate in the final disarmament of the world.

Unfortunately, we cannot speak in this way. I say also, unfortunately, we have not the right to do so. I shall briefly explain, later on, for what reasons. I shall tell you,